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1. Introduction
Networks analysis has gained an increasing
number of adherents over the past twenty
years. Research suggesting that social net-
works influence the behavior of individuals
and groups continues to multiply. As its
popularity has increased, criticisms of net-
work analysis have also proliferated. My
purposes in this article are twofold. First,
I provide brief overviews of the network
literature in three important areas: cen-
trality and power; network subgroups; and
interorganizational relations. The purpose
of this discussion is to demonstrate the rapid
progress that has been made in these areas
durmg the past decade. Second, I discuss
three issues that are the sources of current
theoretical controversies: the relation
between network analysis and rational
choice theory; the role of norms and
culture; and the question of human agency.
I conclude with a brief discussion of future
prospects for network analysis.
2. Background
Network analysis has its roots in several
theoretical perspectives. Some have traced
it to psychiatrist J. L. Moreno ( 193~), who
developed an approach known as soci-
ometry, in which interpersonal relations
were represented pictorially. Others have
traced the approach to the work of British
anthropologists John Barnes ( 195-I), Eliz-
aheth Bott ( 1957), and J. Clyde Mitchell
(1969). And others (Berkowitz 1982) have
even viewed network analysis as an out-
growth of the French structuralism of
Claude Levi-Strauss (1969).
Network analysis can also be viewed as
a subtype within the general framework of
structural sociology ( Wellman 1988). Struc-
tural sociology is an approach in which
social structures, constraints and oppor-
tunities are viewed as having a more pro-
nounced effect on human behavior than do
cultural norms or other subjective states.
The classical roots of structural sociology
can be found m Durkheim, Marx, and
(especially) Simmel. Simmel’s influence on
structural sociology stems from his concern
with the formal properties of social life. For
Simmel, social relations of particular types
followed patterns that took on similar
characteristics in a wide range of contexts.
In any three-actor situation, for example,
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one actor will be successful to the extent
that it can exploit a conflict between the
other two. This pattern may occur among
people, organizations or even countries.
For Simmel, the forms and patterns of
social relations were more important than
their content. As Blau (1982: 276) put it,
structural sociologists are more concerned
with ’the proportion of isolates in a group
[than] whether they are Jack and Jim or Jill
or Joan.’
Although differences exist among ver-
sions of structural sociology, most struc-
tural sociologists agree that objective
factors are more significant determinants of
behavior than are subjective ones. Network
analysis is a type of structural sociology
based on an explicit notion of the effects
of social relations on individual and group
behavior.
3. Principles and methods of
network analysis
The primary tenet of network analysis is
that the structure of social relations deter-
mines the content of those relations. Net-
work theorists reject the notion that people
are combinations of attributes or that insti-
tutions are fixed entities with clearly defined
boundaries. Sociologists frequently use the
terms ’society’, ’government’, and ’econ-
omy’ and refer to individuals in terms such
as ’lower middle class white Protestants
who live in inner city areas and vote Demo-
crat’ (White, Boorman & Breiger 1976:
733). But these terms and categories
obscure what for network theorists is the
primary ’stuff’ of social life: the concrete
webs of social relations that both embody
and transcend conventional organizations
and institutions. Government, for example,
is not a fixed, unitary institution but a num-
ber of subunits, often working at cross-
purposes, whose members develop
coalitions and disputes not only within and
across agencies but also with various actors
outside the state (Martin 1991). Under-
standing the social relations among actors
both inside and outside state agencies
would be necessary in order to explain the
development of government policy, for
example.
Frgurc 1 Two typn of triads
Simmel’> discussion of dvads and triadB
[1917] (1950) illustrates the principle of how
the structure of social relations affects their
content. Not only does the entry of a third
person into a two-person encounter alter
the nature of the relation between the hrst
two people, but the nature of the triad itself
is significant. In a completely connected
triad, illustrated m panel ,A of Figure 1.
each actor interacts with both other actors
In a hierarchical triad, such as that m panel
B of Figure 1, the central actor is in J
brokerage position wrth respect to the other
two, both of whom must deal with the bro-
ker m order to communicate with the other
These two structures, according to networks
theory, create very different forms of inter-
action among group members. The poten-
tial for brokerage allows the central actor
m the triad to extract benefits from ani
situation in which the remaining two actor,
attempt to communicate (Freeman 1979,
Cook 1982, Marsden 1982. Gould & Fer-
nandez 1989).
Network analysis is in theory applicable
to virtuallv any substantive topic. Although
network analvsts have addressed a wide
range of topics, three areas that have
received particular attention, because of
their theoretical salience, are the effects of
actor centralitv on behavior, the rdenU-
fication of network subgroups, and the
nature of relations among organization>.
3.1. Network and actor centrality
During the 1950s and 1960s, a senes of
expenments, beginning at MIT under the
direction of Bavelas ( 1950; Leavitt 1951.
subsequently Hopkins 196-l; Faucheux z
Mackenzie 1966; Mackenzie 1976), found
considerable differences in the character
of group problem-solving activities across I
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Figure 2 Hierarchical and non-hierarchical
structures
various communication structures. Of par-
ticular concern was the relation between an
actor’s centrality and his or her influence
within the group. Leavitt (1951), for
example, showed, using several types of
communication structures, that the dif-
ferences in influence between the most cen-
tral and least central actor increased with
the growing hierarchy of each structure.
Figure 2 presents examples of classic hier-
archical and non-hierarchical five-actor
structures. In the hierarchical structure,
known as the ’wheel’ (panel A ), the central
actor controls the flow of information
between any other pair of actors. In the
non-hierarchical structure (panel B), which
in this case is a ’maximal complete
subgraph’, in which all possible ties exist,
any member of the group can communicate
directly with any other member. Freeman
(1979) has developed a measure of the cen-
tralization of a network, based on the dif-
ference between the centrality of the most
central unit and the other units.’ Freeman
shows that using this measure, the hier-
archical network in Figure 2 has a cen-
tralization score of 1 (the highest possible )
white the non-hierarchical network in
Figure 2 has a score of 0 (the lowest
possible).
The rapid development of network analy-
sis in recent years has led to the resurgence
of both experimental and non-experimental
research on the relation between the cen-
trality and power of social actors. Marsden
(1982), Cook et al. (1983), Markovsky,
Willer & Patton (1988), and the articles
in the September/December, 1992 special
issue of Social Networks provide examples
of experimental and simulation work. Gal-
askiewicz (1979), Mizruchi (1982), Mmtz &
Schwartz ( 1985), and Laumann & Knoke
( 1987 ) provide examples of non-exper-
imental work, all of which operate at the
interorganizational level of analysis. Astley
& Zajac ( 1990), Brass & Burkhardt ( 1992),
and Krackhardt ( 1992) present examples of
the role of centrality withm organizations.
Scott ( 1991), Cook & Whltmeyer ( 1992),
and Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz ( 1993) pro-
vide reviews of this literature.
Although several of these studies have
demonstrated a positive association
between centrality and power, the associ-
ation between the two is more complex
than the earlier studies had suggested.
Simulations and experimental results by
Marsden ( 1982, 1987), Cook et al. ( 1983),
and Markovsky et al. (1988) have found
that m certain types of structures (such as
the restricted access structure presented m
Figure 3), actors with high ’local’ centrality
(Nieminen 1974), such as 7, 8, and 9, may
be more powerful than actors with high
’global’ centrality, such as actor 10.2 In
some situations, high centrality, might actu-
ally be a liability. In a study of the US
electrical eqmpment industry price fixng
conspiracy of the early 196f)s, Baker &
Faulkner ( 1993) found that central actors
were the most likely to be found guilty of
Figure 3 Ten-actor restricted ucress ?iet~i-ork
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crimes. presumably because their central
locations in communication networks made
them more vulnerable to detection. Bon-
acich (1987) has noted that an actor’s power
may be greater if its ties are to relatively
peripheral actors, who must then deal with
the focal actor. In most measures of cen-
trality, actors with ties to peripheral actors
will be less central than those with ties to
central actors, however. This may explain
some situations m which centrality and
power are not highly correlated. Studies by
Cook et al. (1983) and Marsden (1987) have
suggested that the centrality-power relation
is affected by whether the networks are
’positively’ or ’negatively’ connected; m
negatively connected networks, a tie
between actors A and B precludes a tie
between A and C. This corresponds to the
situation described by Bonacich, and it is
in neoativeiv connected networks that Cook
et al. fail to produce the expected a;;oci-
ation between centrality and power. In
Cook et al.’s networks, actors with high
local centrality are more powerful than
those w~th higher levels of global centrality.
Marsden (1987) shows that the relative
power of actors with high global centrality
depends on the extent to which central
actors are able to form coalitions.
Despite the variety of findings on the
relation between centrality and power,
most studies have revealed at least some
substantmely meaningful association. They
are thus consistent With a kev tenet of net-
work theory: that an actor’s position in a
social structure has a significant impact on
its behavior and well-bemg.
3.2. Network subgroups
A second major area within network analy-
sis is the identification of network sub-
groups. Most analyses have operated within
two broad traditions, which Burt (1982) has
labelled ’relational’ and ’positional’.
Relational models are based pnmanly on
graph-theoretic techniques ( Harary, Nor-
man & Cartwright 1965). Their focus is on
the identification of cliques, densely con-
nected regions of networks in which all or
most actors are directly tied to one another,
as in the non-hierarchical structure in
Figure 2 (Alba 1973). Positional models are
based primarily on matrix algebraic tech-
mques (Lorrain & White 1971 ). Their focus
m on the identification ot structurally equi% -
alent actors, pairs of actors with ties to the
same third parties. The most prominent ot
these techniques is blockmodeling, devel-
oped by Harrison White and his students
(White. Boorman & Breiger 1976, see the
June 1992 special issue of SOCial Networkc
for an overview of recent advances). Block-
models are binary representations ot
relation matrices among actors in a
network, permuted so that structurally
equivalent actors are clustered mto square
submatrices, or ’blocks’. Blocks are ident-
ified as either ’zeroblocks’ or ’oneblockv’,
dependmg on the density of the ties among
the actors within them. In practice, a certain
density cutoff point is used to dlstll1gUl&dquo;h
zeroblocks from oneblocks. For example.
in White et al.’s blockmodel of a bIOmedical
research network, the authors found that at
cutoff density in the range of .10 to .50
vielded similar results The representations
of structures can be reduced further
through clustering of structurally equin-
alent blocks into two by two matnces The
patterns of blocks identify different type,
of social structures (White et al. 197b)
Consider, for example, a model m which
the raw data are friendship choices, so that
actors may name particular others as friends
but the ties may or may not be reciprocate
If the matrix, when reduced to a ~ _ &dquo; 2
blockmodel, contains a zeroblock in the
second column of the first row and one-




it would represent a hierarchical structure.
in which ties go from lower to higher-status
actors but not vice versa (White et al. 1970
742). In this example, the high-status actor,,
(row 1 ) choose other high-status actors (col-
umn 1) but do not choose low-status actor,
(column 2). The low-status actors (row 2).
on the other hand, choose both high-status
and other low-status actors (columns 1 and
2 respectively). Blockmodels are not the
only techniques that employ structural
equivalence as a basis for clustenng. Other
widely used techniques, such as factor
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analysis (Allen 1978), multidimensional
,caling (Levine 1972; Laumann & Pappi
1~7b), and the non-discrete structural
equivalence clustering techniques em-
ploved by Burt ( 19X2), often yield clusters
nmtlar to those produced bv blockmodels
(see Breiger, Boorman & Arabic 1975 on
hlockmodel5 versus multrdtmenwonal scal-
ing).
Proponents of vIrtually all clustering tech-
n)ques agree that memher, of particular
clyues or clwters should drsplav wmtlar atti-
tudes and hehavror. But since the graph-
theoretic cliques are based on direct ties
among actors, while blocks and other pow-
tional clusters are based on structural eqmv-
alence, the two models lead to different
predictions about the sources ot mterper-
sona) mtluence and stmuantv Relations in
cliques are based on cohemve ties between
actors In the cohesion models, vhtch hme c
been the most widely used by network ana-
lysts. those who mteract directly wll tend to
Influence one another. The structural equiB -
,tlence model, lead to two pu,mhle mter-
prctattons. One, presented by Friedkm
(14X4) and Mrzrucht (1993). suggests that
structurally equivalent actor, are likel~ to
behave similarly because they have seBer~il
common sources ot direct influence An
sltername argumcnt, presented hN Burt
I ly?;7 ), suggests that ,tructurallv equnatent
dctors. Because they IOll1tl~ occupy the same
positions m social structure,,, compete tor
the tavor of occupants ot other posmons
Because ot thl&dquo; competItIon, actor&dquo;.He like I z
to mimic acttons taken hv their ,tructurallv
equivalent peers.
Both the cohesion and structural equiB,-
alence model, have receIved Cl)J1&dquo;lderable
support m the literature. A few ot the many
eramples that support the coheslon model
~re studies bv Moore (1979). Friedkin
(19K4), and Laumann & Knoke (19S7)
Studies supportmg the structural eqlll~-
alence model mclude those bB Burt 11~~71,
Juhnson ( 1986), and Galasktewct & Burt
l1991). Some studies have found support
tor both approaches (Mizruchi 1992. 19U3)
3.3. Network analysis and
interorganizational relations
For many years, a frequently II1voked rrm-
cisnt of network anatvsts was that tts adher-
ents had been successful in presenting
elegant mathematical descriptions of social
structures but they had been less successful
in demonstrating that those structures have
actual behavioral consequences. In no area
has this criticism been more prominent than
in the nudy of rnterorgantzattonal relations.
Although a few early studies had shown
that centrality in interorganizational net-
works was associated with identifiable
organizational outcomes, including an
urganrzatron’a likelihood of political success
(Ga)askiewicz 1979) and its investment
strategies (Ratclitt 1980). there were few
such demonstrations prior to the mld-1LJXOs.
Since that time, however, there has been a
proliferation ot studies suggesting that a
hrm’s position in interfirm networks tnflu-
ence, its behavior. Much of this work has
appeared in business management pub-
lication,, and has been concerned with the
effects of board ot director composition on
managerial strategies. Boards ot directors
are significant because a firm’s directors
otten sit on the hoards ot other firms, cre-
.itin,, what are called ’interlocking direc-
tor,ite,, Interlock networks are the most
studied form of interorgamzational
relations Although there are several com-
peting Biewsot the role that interlocks plav.
many theorists behove that they provide an
indicator of mtertlrm social rotations that,
it the prediction, of network theory are
accurate, should influence the behavior of
hrms (see PettlgreBB 1992: Mlizruchi 1994
for reviews ot these model; ) ,
Several Studies ot board composition
withm the business management literature
tocus on the role of outside directors.
Because outside directors are usually affilr-
ated with other corporations, this variable
ulw provides an indicator of the extent to
which a firm is integrated into interfirm
networks. The organizational literature
suggests that these ties have a significant
impact on corporate strategies, In a study
ot the use ot ’grccnmail’ , the private repur-
chase ot company stock, Rosnik (1987)
tound that firms that resisted greenmail had
more outside directors and more directors
who represented firms with which the focal
firm had transactions than did firms that
paid greenmail. Studies by Cochran, Wood
LB: Jones (1’-)85), Siiigh Lk Hananto (1’-)89),
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and Wade, O’Reilly & Chandratat (1990)
found that the proportion of outside direc-
tors on a firm’s board was positively associ-
ated with the existence of ’golden
parachute’ policies for the firm’s top execu-
tives.~ Davis (1991), in a study of firms’
adoption of takeover defenses (known as
’poison pills’), found that firms were more
likely to adopt poison pills when they
shared directors with firms that had already
adopted. Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk (1991)
found a negative association between the
proportion of outside board members and
firms’ research and development expen-
ditures. Clawson & Neustadtl (1989) and
Mizruchi (1992) found that director inter-
locks influenced corporate political strat-
egies. Haunschild (1993), Fligstem &
Markowitz ( 1993), and Palmer et al. (1993)
found an association between interlocks
and firms’ participation in mergers and
acquisitions. Boeker & Goodstein (1993)
found that firms with a higher proportion
of outsiders on their boards were more
likely to appoint CEOs from outside the
firm. And Stearns & Mizruchi ( 1993; Mizru-
chi & Stearns 1994) found that the presence
of representatives of financial institutions
on a firm’s board influenced both the
amount and type of financing the firm used.
What are the processes by which these
networks are purported to influence firm
behavior? One example is provided by a
recent study of corporate political action
(Mizruchi 1992). The concern of the study
was the similanty of political behavior
between pairs of large US manufacturing
firms. Among the network variables
expected to lead to similarity of behavior
were the economic interdependence of the
two firms, whether the firms’ stock was held
by the same institutional investors, and two
types of director interlocks, those created
by direct ties between the firms, and those
in which the two firms each shared directors
with the same third firm. Focusing on the
interlock effects, the argument proceeded
as follows: firms enter into a political situa-
tion with a set of both clear and uncertain
preferences. Other things being equal, the
leaders of interlocked firms are more likely
to communicate with one another than are
the leaders of non-interlocked firms.
Among the ideas that may be communi-
cated is information about political can- i
didates. Exposure to either positive or I
negative information from other firm rep- I
resentatives about candidates may affect i
a firm’s decision-making. When two firms i
share interlocks with several additional I
firms (indirect ties, which I interpreted as
an indicator of structural equivalence), they
are exposed to several common sources of
information. This further increases the like-
lihood that they will contribute to the same
candidates. The findings from this study
indicated that the presence of mdirect ties
between firms was more strongly associated
with contributions to the same candidates
than was the presence of direct ties. The
simultaneous exposure to several common
sources of information may be one expla-
nation for this.
Even ordinary economic activities maN
be affected by interfirm relations. Uzzi
( 1993), for example, in a study of the gar-
ment industry in New York, found that
firms that were about to relocate their facili-
ties offshore warned their suppliers months
in advance, despite the fact that such knowl-
edge created an incentive for the suppliers
to shirk on their orders. Uzzi attributed this
apparently irrational behavior to the close
social relations among members of the
industrv.
Granovetter (1985) has provided a gen-
eral theoretical model within which to
account for such behavior. Departing from
Oliver Williamson’s (1975) version of trans-
action cost economics, Granovetter argues
that the social relations that develop among
customers and suppliers often mitigate, or
completely nullify, the opportunism that.
according to Williamson, characterizes mar-
ket transactions. Williamson (1991) is able
to account for non-opportunistic behavior
with the concept of asset specificity, in which
repeated transactions create incentives for
maintaining the relations, despite the
reduced opportunities for opportunistic
behavior. But these situations are seen by
Williamson as aberrations rather than as
basic components of his model.
4. Structural sociology and
rational choice theory
The contrast between the Granovetter and
Williamson models of interfirm transactions
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raises the issue of the relation between net-
work models and economic models in gen-
eral. Structural sociology developed in the
United States during the 1970s as an
alternative to the normative model that
dominated the field during the 1950s and
1960s. This model, best characterized by
the work of Talcott Parsons (1951), sug-
gested that the basis of social order was
in shared generalized beliefs (values) and
expectations of behavior (norms). These
values and norms, according to the model,
were internalized, primarily through child-
hood socialization. To the extent that this
socialization is successful, human action
voluntarily proceeds according to the
society’s values and norms.~ Structural soci-
ology, with its emphasis on the constraints
and opportunities that influence behavior,
tended to de-emphasize or discount entirely
the role of internalized norms. People may
behave according to norms not because
they have internalized them, but because
they fear the sanctions that could apply if
they violate them.
Because structural sociology and net-
work analysis can be viewed as alternatives
to normative sociology, it would be worth-
while to consider the relation between
structural sociology and another widely
used alternative to normative sociology:
rational choice theory. The rational choice
cntique of the normative perspective shares
many similarities with the structural
critique. Rational choice theorists are also
concerned about the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing between internalization of
norms and fear of sanctions. When we
observe customers in a store paying for
their goods (and refraining from stealing),
we have no way of knowing whether they
do this because they have internalized the
norm that stealing is wrong or whether they
simply fear the consequences should they
be caught. Because it is impossible empiri-
cally to distinguish the two accounts, and
because even normative theorists acknowl-
edge that cases of the latter do occur,
rational choice theorists tend to assume that
fear of sanctions rather than internalization
of norms drives normatively prescribed
behavior. Rational choice theorists thus
agree with structural theorists that in the
absence of unambiguous evidence that
actors internalize norms, there is little ana-
lytical benefit in assuming that they do
(Hechter 1987). Moreover, both models
are concerned with the opportunities and
constraints that actors face. Hedstrom’s
suggestion (1993: 167) that rational choice
theory ’usually assumes that variations in
individual behavior are explained by dif-
ferences in the opportunity structures
actors face, rather than by variations in the
internal &dquo;makeup&dquo; of the actors’ could be
said of structural sociology as well.
Where structural sociology and rational
choice theory diverge is in their analysis
of the determinants of behavior. Rational
choice theorists usually assume that indi-
viduals enter social situations with exogen-
ouslv formed preferences (utility functions)
that remain constant throughout the social
encounter. This assumption has enabled
rational choice theorists to develop power-
ful and rigorous models of social outcomes,
but these models are often suspect empiri-
cally because of the simplifying assumptions
necessary to generate them. Structural soci-
ology has no built-in assumptions about the
rationality of human actors. But there is
nothing in the structural model that pre-
cludes the assumption of human rationality,
and many structural sociologists have
assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, a
rational actor model (Burt 1982; Grano-
vetter 1985; Mizruchi 1992). The primary
differences between the structural model
and the rational choice model are that in
the structural model ( 1 ) human preferences
are viewed as endogenous; that is, the for-
mation of preferences is taken as something
to be explained; and (2) human action is
viewed as affected by explicitly defined
social structures.
As an example of the differences between
the two perspectives, I have presented a
distinction between what I term ’individual’
and ’structural’ interests (Mizruchi, Allison
& Potts, 199~; see also Burt 1982: ch. 5).
Because network theorists argue that all
interests are endogenous, I use the concept
of individual interests primarily as an ana-
lytic tool. An individual interest is a pref-
erence that an actor holds in the absence of
external constraints. A structural interest is
a preference held by an actor subject to
social constraints, which differs from what
336
the preference would be in the absence of
those constraints. A firm that changes its
position on a political issue to accommodate
a powerful customer is revealing a struc-
tural interest. There is nothing in this model
that prevents the firm from being viewed
as a rational actor. But the firm’s rational
action is viewed as occurring within a sys-
tem of constraints, identified by the social
structures within which the firm is embed-
ded.
Consider a case taken from a current
study of political decision-making (Mizru-
chi, Allison & Potts 1994). Let us assume
that an actor enters a political situation with
a position on an issue and a level of salience,
the latter based on how important the issue
is to the actor. Let us also assume that the
actor is embedded in a network of depen-
dence relations, in which others on whom
the actor depends may hold opposing pol-
itical positions. If an actor determines that
the need to maintain positive relations with
others upon whom he or she depends
exceeds the salience of the issue, he or she
may decide to switch to the other actor’s
position. In the study cited above, we con-
duct a simulation that illustrates the extent
to which political outcomes can be affected
by even small levels of network depen-
dence. Although the model contains certain
rational choice elements of decision-
making, the social structure alters the pol-
itical outcomes m systematic ways. These
outcomes cannot be understood without an
examination of that structure. For related
examples, see Marsden’s (1982) modi-
fication of Coleman’s (1990) model of
power as well as Stokman and Van den Bos
(1992).
5. Problems of network
analysis and structural
sociology
Structural sociology has revitalized several
areas of sociology, including social move-
ment theory, the study of social inequality,
the sociology of development, and even
research on attitude formation. The struc-
tural approach has forced researchers to
consider aspects of the social world that had
previously received insufficient attention,
but a single-minded focus on structural con-
straints renders our explanations mcom-
plete in two areas: the origins and content
of preferences and the effects of human
agency. These areas have been a pnmary
focus of recent cnticisms of network analy-
sis.
5.1. The role of norms
Despite the criticisms mentioned above,
one advantage of the normative model is its
explicit attempt to identify both the origins
and the content of people’s worldmews.
Network theory can explam why, given that
a person’s friends are political liberals, the
person is likely to hold liberal positions as
well. As noted in the previous section, this
endogeneity of preferences is an advantage
of the structural model over the rational
choice model. But the network approach
cannot explain why particular groups of
people hold liberal views in the first place
Suppose that an actor is a member of the
workmg class in an industrialized nation.
Members of the working class have his-
toncally tended to support labor or socialist
parties. It is not always possible to deter-
mine whether an individual supports labor-
oriented candidates because it is in his or
her individual interest to do so (in other
words, that this support would occur in the
absence of influence by others), or whether
the person supports such candidates
because of influence by others. Some ver-
sions of the structural model can explains
why an actor would have an interest in
voting for labor or socialist candidates even
if he or she were not directly influenced by
others. In this case, one votes according to
one’s economic interest. But the network
model cannot account for this support in
the absence of influence by others, because
it has no way of determining the content of
one’s preferences. [Even the assumption
that is possible objectively to identify a
voter’s economic interest is problematic.
One could argue, for example, that in the
long run, protectionist trade measures
might harm the economy, which might
harm the workers whom the measures were
designed to protect. This possibility might
explain why in the United States a signifi-
cant proportion of workers support con-
servative political candidates.]
337
It is possible to argue that everyone’s
preferences, no matter how isolated they
appear, have been influenced by others at
some point. But if a preference is the result
of an earlier socialization experience, then
the structural model loses much of its ana-
lytic advantage over the normative model,
since the person’s preference is guided by
internalized norms rather than ongoing
social relations. In the above example, the
worker’s support for the labor-backed party
might have been cemented dunng his or her
childhood socialization. Moreover, many
structural arguments are mahle only
because of an implicit assumption of well-
established norms, although it is not nec-
essary for actors to mternalize those norms,
as long as they agree to abide by them
(Sciulli 1992). Baker’s ( 19884) studv of pnce
volatility on the floor of the Chicago stock
exchange is a good example. Baker found
that prices fluctuated more widely in large
groups than in small groups because face-
to-face interaction among traders was more
difficult m the larger groups. But Baker’s
study works only if we assume that par-
ticipants m the stock exchange agree on the
rules of tradmg.
If it is possible to identify an actor’s pol-
itical preferences and if those preferences
predict behavior even m the absence of
clear interpersonal influence, then an
actor’s personal attributes, such as class or
race, may generate accurate predictions. So
we can predict that a member of the work-
ing class will support a labor party simply
by noting that the person is a member of the
working class. In such a case, a structural
model may be useful, but a network model,
in which the use of categories is eschewed,
may be unnecessary. Even if categorical
thinking often obscures the social processes
by which preferences form and action
occurs, it may also provide a predictive
power that m some cases exceeds that of a
network model.
This argument forms the basis of a recent
critique of network analysis by Brint (1992).
Focusing specifically on the work of White,
Brint suggests that categories often form
the basis of social identities and roles that
have various normative dictates that pro-
vide bases for action. In his reply, White
(1992a) does not deny that norms are nec-
essary for social structures to operate but
argues that social structures are a necessary
precondition for the generation of common
normative frameworks. One reason that
people from different groups within a par-
ticular society (urban youths versus middle-
aged suburbanites, for example) have dif-
ficulty communicating is that their social
isolation has given them little opportunity
for common experiences and understand-
ings.
The concept of structural equivalence in
fact was first developed to capture the con-
cept of a role. It was later discovered that
the mathematical representation of struc-
tural equivalence was unable to do this
because structural equivalence was defined
m terms of ties to the same particular actors
(so that two fathers could be structurally
equivalent only if they had the same
children: see Winship [1973] 1988). Net-
work theonsts have developed the concept
of role equivalence to deal with this issue.
Role-equivalent actors need not be tied to
the same other actors but instead need only
be involved m similar types of relations with
similar types of actors (see, m addition to
Wmship’s article, Sailer 1978, White &
Reitz 1983 ; Burt 1990; Borgatti & Everett
1992: Mizruchi 1993). The concept of role
equivalence and its variants (including
automorphic and regular equivalence)
acknowledge the fact that social roles are
likely to be accompanied by normative pre-
scnptions. The significant point is that these
roles are defined in terms of one’s position
in a social structure.
The debate between network theorists
and proponents of the Brint position is
unlikely to be resolved soon but the volume
of dialogue has increased sigmficantlv in
the past five years. Those who emphasize
the role of culture frequently acknowledge
the importance of social structure. And net-
work analysts increasmgly acknowledge the
existence of gaps in structural explanations
that may require cultural or normative
accounts to fill. Still, even if proponents of
a particular position admit that the alterna-
live has something to offer, the debate con-
tinues to raise an issue of analytical
strategy; that is, which approach, which
starting-point, provides more explanatory
leverage’? Thm question also remains open.
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What can be said is that as a research strat-
egy, network analysis has demonstrated
considerable analytic power. 5
5.2. The role of agency
A second problem shared by both network
analysis and structural sociology in general
is their treatment of human agency. [The
normative model often fares no better on
this score, but that is irrelevant here. Struc-
tural theorists emphasize the extent to
which human actions are affected by con-
straints and opportunities. But they have
failed to develop a comprehensive model
of human agency.
The claim that structural models often
have underdeveloped conceptions of
human agency has been raised by several
theorists (Giddens 198~; Haines 1988;
Cohen 1989; Brint 1992). One explicit early
attempt to include agency in a structural
theory was presented by Burt (1982). In
Burt’s model, social structure affects
action, both indirectly (through its effect
on actor interests) and directiv. Action is
then viewed as potentially modifying the
social structure itself (ibid: 9). Critics
(Haines 1988; Cohen 1989) have argued,
however, that even Burt fails to develop an
explicit model of exactly how social action
modifies social structures. Haines ( 1988),
drawmg on Giddens, has emphasized the
recursive nature of human action, in which
actions simultaneously are affected by and
recreate social structures. Several recent
works by network theonsts have moved us
closer to a theoretically ngorous model of
agency. Two works in particular, those by
Burt (1992) and White (1992b), have dealt
explicitly with the issue.’ Ó
Burt is concerned with how actors ident-
ify and take advantage of opportunities in
social systems, vacancies that he refers to
as ’structural holes’. This attention to
vacancies in social structures has been a
significant component of White’s work
( 1970, 1992a; White, Boorman & Breiger
1976). By filling a hole, an actor increases
his or her likelihood of upward mobility but
he/she also alters the structure so that a
hole no longer exists in the same position.
Burt shows how actors who are skilled at
filltng structural holes and in maximizing
the efficiency of their social ties (by mini-
mizing redundant contacts, for example),
have greater upward mobility within an
organization than do actors who are less
successful at both using and altering the
social structure.
White (1992b) has attempted to recon-
ceptualize human action in terms of iden-
nties seeking control. Identities are any
form of activity to which we can attribute
meaning. Persons exist only as ’ensembles
of identities’ (White 1992a: 210). Identities
exist only to the extent that actors are able
to differentiate themselves from others.
Human action is a constant search for
niches within which to sustain identities.
Through the quest for control, actors con-
tinuously create and recreate social struc-
tures. In his earlier work on markets, for
example, White ( l9bR; Leifer & White
1987) argued that rather than consisting of
a series of similar firms producing a similar
product, markets consist of a variety of
producers differentiated by the volume and
quality of their products. White dem-
onstrates mathematically that markets can
reproduce themselves only to the extent
that producers are able to carve out unique
niches for themselves.
6. Conclusion
Structural sociology and network analysis.
with their emphasis on objective, observ-
able social forces and their ability to gen-
erate falsifiable hypotheses, have provided
an improvement over some of the prob-
lematic aspects of traditional normative
models. But structural models have been
limited by their inability to handle the cul-
tural content of social action as well as by
their underdeveloped conception of human
agency. The above discussion suggests that
network analysis holds particular promise
for dealing with the issues of culture and
human agency that have posed problems
for structural sociology in general. With its
emphasis on concrete social relations rather
than categories, network analysis presents
a more dynamic conception of social action
than do either the traditional normative or
structural models.
It is important to recognize that network
analysis can complement as well as supplant
existing perspectives. A good example of
how network analysis can extend the ana-
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lytic power of an alternative theory is its
relation to what is perhaps the most widely
held sociological model of organizations:
institutional theory. Institutional theory is
based on the premise that organizations,
rather than providing rational solutions to
well-defined problems, are equally likely
to reinforce societal symbols, or ’myths’
(Meyer & Rowan 1977; Powell and Di-
Maggio, 1991). As part of this reinforce-
ment, organizations continually seek legit-
imacy from their external environments.
Rather than a quest for an objective notion
of efficiency, organizational behavior
becomes a quest for legitimacy. An impor-
tant statement of this model has been pre-
sented by DiMaggio & Powell (1983)
DiMaggio and Powell argue that organ-
izational forms in modern societies come to
resemble one another, not because these
forms are necessarily the most efficient,
but rather because the need for legitimacy
requires them DiMagg~o and Powell ident-
ify three types of this ’isomorphism’ : coerc-
ive, in which organizations develop
structures to conform to the expectations of
other organizations on which they depend:
mimetic, in which organizations, under con-
ditions of uncertainty, simply adopt the
structures of their peers: and normative, in
which similar socialization experiences lead
to worldviews that generate similar types
of prescribed solutions to organizational
problems. What the DiMaggio and Powell
model lacks, and what network analysis can
provide, is a detailed conception of the
processes by which this isomorphism is
transmitted. Coercive isomorphisni is likely
to occur in situations of direct, cohesive
relations among organizations. Mimetic
isomorphism is likely to occur when organ-
izations observe and try to keep pace with
their structurally equivalent or role equiv-
alent peers. Network theory cannot tell u;
why there are particular symbols and myth
that organizations strive to reinforce. But
it can explain why certain forms as opposed
to others are adopted, regardless of
whether thev are objectively more efficient.
In that sense, although network theory may
require an institutional or similar per-
spective to completely account for a
phenomenon, institutional theory may
require network theory as well. The latter
can render institutional concepts both more
concrete and more rigorous.
In fact, its versatility is one of the great
strengths of network analysis. Not only can
network analysis be employed in con-
junction with institutional theory but it is
compatible with and capable of extending
the population ecology and transaction cost
models as well. The population ecology
notion of an organizational niche has been
reconceptualtzed within the terms of struc-
tural equivalence by DiMaggio (1986; see
also Burt 1992). And the concept of trans-
action costs has been formalized in analyses
of brokerage (Marsden 1982) and broad-
ened in Granovetter’s ( 19R~) discussion of
embeddedness. The connection between
network analysis and the resource depen-
dence model is already well established and
need not be repeated here (Burt 19R3:
Pfeffer 1987 ; Mizruchi 1992).
Although network analysts continue to
grapple with the theoretical problems dis-
cussed above, there is reason for optimism.
Increased attention to the issue of agency
has led to significant advances within the
past five years. As theorists take advantage
of the stochastic assumptions behind net-
work models, progress on the agencv-struc-
ture dilemma seems imminent. Greater
efforts to acknowledge the importance of
culture have also proven encouraging [see,
for example, White’s recent (1993) work on
art]. As White has demonstrated, network
analysis can be valuable in examining the
contexts through which culture is trans-
mitted.
Network analysis is one of the fastest
growing approaches in the social sciences.
The evidence that human action is affected
by the social relations within which actors
are embedded continues to mount. I have
presented only a small piece of that evi-
dence here. The size of the pie wtll continue
to grow.
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Notes
’ This measure has three variations. based on
Freeman’s three conceptions of centrahty dis-
cussed below The hamc computation involves
summtng the difference, between the centr.ilitB
of the most central unit and all other unit, and
then dividing this sum by the maximum possible
sum of differences for a network of that size
= Although there have been ,several advances
m recent years, the most comprehensive theor-
etical statement on centrality remain,, Freeman s
( 1979) work. Freeman distinguished three types
of centralrty, bascd on c~cyc~c°, closonwc, and
henveemness Degree refer,, to the number of
direct ties between an actor and other actors m
a network Closenesv refers to the extent tu w hich
an actor can reach a large number of other actors
m a small number of steps And betweenne,,-
refers to the extent to whtch an actor creates a
unique path between other actors, so that the
latter must deal with the former if they are to
communicate The definition ot centrallt~ pre-
sented by Bonacich ( 197~, and elaborated and
modified in 19~7) has also heen highiB mtluential
See also Mizruchi et al ( 1~~(,). Stephen’on 8:
Zelen ( 19XV>, and Fnl:dkll1 (1441)
’ Golden parachute agreement,, are )ucrat<Be e
severance packages that are guaranteed to chief
executives m the event they are hred These ptans
proliferated in the US husmess world durmg the
l9SUs
’ Of course, the model was tar more cumplm
and varied than this brtef account suggests But
it did place a malor cmphaw on the role of
learned norms in influencing heh,mor
&dquo; It is necessary to consider the role of culture
to understand the content of n(irm,iti~c pre-
scriptions associated with social relations One
conception of culture that could be u,etul for
structural sucmlogv has been presented by Smd-
ler (1 4X6) Swidler argues that culture can best
be understood as a system ut learned bch,i%>ior,
that actors use to negotiate their dailn activities
These behaviors are learned in specific social
contexts and must be contnuously reinforced m
those contexts What is %>~iluablc about thm model
is the vtew that norms are not necessarilv part ot
a generalized value system but rather develop in
specific hehavtoral contexts
&dquo; See also the articles m Weeste & Flap (199&dquo;).
whtch include discussions of methods for hand-
ling changes in networks over time
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